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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSHUA ERSKINE, : Case No. 20090994-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for orie count of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2008) and one 
count of Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (2008), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Robert Adkins, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-103(3)(i) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, 
Judgment, Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Erskine the 
opportunity of probation and instead imposed concurrent prison terms where several 
mitigating factors indicated that he was amenable to probation and the "general 
matrix/criminal history assessment" guidelines indicated a recommendation of 
intermediate sanctions. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews sentences, including the denial of 
probation, for an abuse of discretion. State v. Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, f 2, 176 P.3d 
459; State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "'An abuse of 
discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently 
unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 
1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) (quotations and citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was not preserved below. However, this court should 
review Mr. Erskine's sentence for plain error. Plain error occurs when "(i) [a]n error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant[.]" State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, H 41, 82 P.3d 1006 (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal. Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2008). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 8, 2008, Mr. Erskine was charged by information with one count of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, 
one count of Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-203, one count of Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
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Code Ann. § 76-5-103, one count of Attempted Aggravated Robbery, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, one count of Aggravated Assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103, and one count of 
Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
106(2)(c)(d). R. 1-6. On September 9, 2009, the State amended the charges to include an 
additional count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 and converted the Attempted Aggravated Robbery charge to Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony. R. 91-6. 
Pursuant to plea negotiations, Mr. Erskine entered a guilty plea to one count of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and one count of Aggravated Assault, a 
second degree felony. R. 97-101. The remaining counts were dismissed. A presentence 
report was ordered and prepared for sentencing purposes. R 121. 
On October 20, 2009, a sentencing hearing was held. R. 107. The trial court 
imposed an indeterminate prison term of no less than five years for the Aggravated 
Robbery charge and an indeterminate prison term of not less than one year for the 
Aggravated Assault charge to run concurrently. R. 107-08. Mr. Erskine filed a timely 
notice of appeal on November 18, 2009. R. 111-12. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 8, 2009, Mr. Erskine entered a guilty plea to one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony and one count of aggravated assault, a second 
degree felony. R. 97-101. On October 20, 2009, a sentencing hearing was held. R. 107. 
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The aggravated robbery charge stemmed from an incident in which Mr. Erskine 
and an accomplice stole ecstasy pills from Kyle Powers. R. 98. In the course of taking 
the pills, Mr. Erskine hit Mr. Powers with nunchucks. R. 98, The aggravated assault 
charge stemmed from an incident in which Mr. Erskine hit Jason Hope in the head 
causing serious injury. R. 98. 
In entering his guilty plea, Mr. Erskine acknowledged that on or about October 28, 
2008, he had caused serious bodily injury to another by hitting that person in the head. R. 
98. Mr. Erskine also acknowledged that the following day, October 29, 2008, as a party 
to the offense, he had participated in taking property from another person against his will 
and by the use of force, and that during the taking, he had hit the victim using a pair of 
nunchucks. Id. 
A presentence report was ordered by the court and prepared by Adult Probation 
and Parole (AP&P). R. 121. The report included a "general matrix/criminal history 
assessment" which indicated a recommendation of intermediate sanctions. Id. In the 
presentence report, AP&P varied from the guideline recommendation, and instead 
recommended that the prison terms be imposed without probation. R. 121:3. AP&P's 
report scored Mr. Erskine in the high risk category identifying areas of concern including 
a criminal history involving assault related offenses and problems with Mr. Erskine's 
employment history, education, alcohol and substance abuse, companions and non-
rewarding family. R. 121:2. Concerning his criminal history, Mr. Erskine has no prior 
felony convictions. R. 121:8. 
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In his statement for the presentence report, Mr. Erskine stated, "I wish I would 
have never done these things not just because I got caught but because I wouldn't want to 
have it happen to me or anyone else. These crimes were wrong and I feel very sorry and 
sympathy for the victims of my crimes." R. 121:6. His mother and his fiance both wrote 
letters to the judge on his behalf. R. 121. 
At sentencing, the State asked the court to impose consecutive prison sentences. R. 
120:36. Defense counsel argued that Mr. Erskine should be given a chance on probation 
or additional time in jail rather than prison. R. 120:44. He noted that Mr. Erskine 
cooperated with police and was forthcoming with information regarding other crimes. R. 
120:4. Counsel also informed the court that Mr. Erskine had been accidently released 
from jail but came to his next scheduled court date. R. 120:6-7. Although Mr. Erskine 
was unsupervised, he stayed with his family and did not get into trouble. Id. In light of 
these factors, defense counsel asked the court to give Mr. Erskine probation or additional 
jail time rather than a prison sentence. 
Taking these arguments into account, the trial court denied Mr. Erskine's request 
to be put on probation and sentenced him to serve two concurrent prison terms of one to 
fifteen years and five years to life. R. 120:46. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Erskine argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 
request to be put on probation and instead sentenced him to serve two concurrent prison 
terms of one-to-fifteen years and five years to life. At sentencing, defense counsel 
informed the court of several mitigating factors that indicated that Mr. Erskine would be 
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amenable to probation. Most notably, when Mr. Erskine was accidently released from 
jail, he came to his next scheduled court appearance rather than fleeing. Also, based on 
his limited criminal history, the "general assessment/criminal history matrix" contained 
in Mr. Erskine's presentence report recommended intermediate sanctions rather than 
imprisonment. In light of these factors, Mr. Erskine believes that the trial court abused its 
discretion by sending him to prison rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt and 
placing him on probation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MR. 
ERSKINE5 S REQUEST TO BE PLACED ON PROBATION AND INSTEAD 
SENTENCING HIM TO TWO CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS 
"Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no matter how unsullied a 
reputation one convicted of crime may be able to demonstrate to the trial judge." State v. 
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957). "The granting or withholding of probation 
involves considering intangibles of character, personality and attitude, of which the cold 
record gives little inkling." Id. "These matters, which are to be considered in connection 
with the prior record of the accused, are of such nature that the problem of probation 
must of necessity rest within the discretion of the judge who hears the case." Id. "This is 
not to say that if it were clearly shown that the trial judge would have granted probation 
except for some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration, such 
refusal might be so capricious and arbitrary as to warrant the conclusion that he did not in 
fact exercise his discretion and justify a review of his action." Id.; see State v. Rhodes, 
818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Because so many different ingredients factor 
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into the sentencing process, and because the discretionary imposition of probation rests in 
many cases upon subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold record, before the review 
court may overturn the sentence ... 'it must be clear that the actions of the judge were so 
inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion.'" (citation omitted)). 
Although accorded "wide latitude in sentencing[,]" a judge's sentencing discretion 
is not unlimited. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^ 66, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. Carson, 597 
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979). While "discretion in sentencing is not subject to 
mathematical formula[,]" the "overriding consideration is that the sentence be just." State 
v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, ^  19, 5 P.3d 1228 (citation and quotation omitted). A 
trial court abuses its discretion when its actions are "inherently unfair[,]" the court 
imposes "a clearly excessive sentence^]" or denies probation on a "wholly irrelevant, 
improper or inconsequential consideration." State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
1997)(citation and quotations omitted); Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. This court will find a 
trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
Here, Mr. Erskine argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sending him 
to prison rather than putting him on probation. In particular, Mr. Erskine believes that, by 
appearing at his next scheduled court date after being accidently released from jail, he 
demonstrated to the court that he is an excellent candidate for probation. R. 120:6. For the 
week between his accidental release and his next court appearance, Mr. Erskine was 
unsupervised by AP&P or Pretrial Services. R. 120:7. Although he could have made the 
decision to flee, he came to court and faced the consequences of his crimes. R. 120:7. 
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While he was free, Mr. Erskine stayed with his family and did not get into trouble. Id. 
Given that his actions demonstrated a tremendous amount of integrity, Mr. Erskine 
believes that the court should have allowed him the opportunity of probation rather than 
impose concurrent prison sentences. 
Mr. Erskine's criminal history is relatively minor. The "general matrix/criminal 
history assessment" contained in the presentence report recommended intermediate 
sanctions rather than imprisonment. R. 121. AP&P indicated, however, that an area of 
concern was Mr. Erskine's criminal history of assault related offenses. R. 121:2. His 
juvenile record and his adult record each include one assault related charge. R. 121:13. At 
sentencing, defense counsel informed the court that Mr. Erskine's juvenile assault charge 
stemmed from an incident in which he was the victim and both parties were cited. R. 
120:11. Because the juvenile charge was eventually dismissed, Mr. Erskine believes that 
it should not be held against him in his sentencing determination. 
The charge from his adult record stemmed from an incident involving a family 
argument where Mr. Erskine pushed his father. R. 120:12. Mr. Erskine entered a plea in 
abeyance and complied with the court's orders. Id. These are his only assault related 
offenses. Mr. Erskine's juvenile record also includes non-assault related misdemeanors 
charges of criminal trespass, habitual truancy, and a theft of $299 or less. R. 121:8. 
Mr. Erskine acknowledges that he has a criminal hislory but he argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying his request for probation. Mr. Erskine's criminal 
history does not appear to be the history of a hardened criminal. Rather, it appears to be 
the history of a young man struggling with adolescence and drug problems. It was 
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appropriate for the trial court to consider "deterrence and punishment" when imposing 
sentence. State v. Hopkins, 2006 UT App 498, 2006 WL 3648344, *1. Mr. Erskine, 
however, believes that the trial court erred by allowing these factors to outweigh other 
more important considerations. 
Although not indicated in the presentence report, defense counsel informed the 
court of several mitigating factors relevant to Mr. Erskine's sentencing. R. 120:9. First, 
Mr. Erskine is young. At the time of sentencing he was twenty years old. Id. He has time 
to change his life for the better. Next, Mr. Erskine assisted the police in the resolution of 
other crimes. Id. When interviewed by the police, he was forthcoming with details about 
crimes unrelated to his arrest. Id. Finally, Mr. Erskine has demonstrated an attitude that 
suggests that he is amenable to supervision. Id. He involved himself in treatment while 
in jail and actively sought to participate in the CATS program, a class that normally 
would not be available to him prior to commitment. R. 120:^0. In light of these 
mitigating factors, Mr. Erskine believes that the trial court abused its discretion by 
sending him to prison rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt. 
Further, Mr. Erskine accepted responsibility for his actions. At sentencing, 
speaking on his own behalf, Mr. Erskine said: 
I'd just want to recognize how a, wrong my choices were and how badly 
people got hurt. I realize that I made a very big mistake in my life and I 
chose to do that. I chose to do drugs and I chose to make those bad 
decisions. But I just want to tell the court how dedicated I am to stay clean 
and never do anything in this nature again. 
R. 120:22. Accordingly, Mr. Erskine believes that the trial court erred in imposing 
concurrent prison terms rather than giving him probation. 
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The error of discounting relevant mitigating factors and sending Mr. Erskine to 
prison rather than giving him probation should have been obvious to the trial court. "An 
error is obvious if the law on the area was 'sufficiently clear or plainly settled[.]'" State 
v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, If 5, 113 P.3d 998 (quoting State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ffif 
16-17, 95 P.3d 276). A trial court abuses its discretion when it '"fails to consider all 
legally relevant [sentencing] factors,'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)), or when the trial 
judge fails to give '"adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" State v. Helms, 
2002 UT 12,1| 15, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). 
The trial court's error in not giving adequate weight to the mitigating factors 
during sentencing was harmful, and that but for this error, "there [was] a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant". Casey, 2003 UT 55 at ^41 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Erskine respectfully asks this Court to reverse and 
remand for resentencing because he believes that the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying his request to be placed on probation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7^g_ day of May, 2010. ^ ~ 
SHEkf^ VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY^ 
I, SHERRY VALDEZ, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0854, this T % (lay of May, 2010. 
SHERDS VALDEZ 
DELIVERED this day of May, 2010. 
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Tab A 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOSHUA J ERSKINE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 
Judge: 
Date: 
081402918 FS 
ROBERT ADKINS 
October 20, 2009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: pamfw 
Prosecutor: HAMILTON, TYSON V 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, STEPHEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 12, 1988 
Audio 
Tape Number: Courtroom 3 6 Tape Count: 11:03/11:56 
CHARGES 
3. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Plea: Not Guilty 
5. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
1st Degree Felony 
• Disposition: 09/08/2009 Guilty 
2nd Degree Felony 
• Disposition: 09/08/2009 Guilty 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 081402918 
Date: Oct 20, 2009 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
On the record, Court oders these charges to run concurrent to each 
other. Court recommends the Conquest Program. Court recommends 
the defendant receive credit for time already served. Restitution 
is sent to the Board of Pardons. , 
Date: AH WP°9 
Py JROBERTl AI)KINS:;^ -3^ 7 
^;^^CJIO«^FJUDGE 
STAT! Of UTAH ^ 
COUNTY O f S A L T ^ K I 
I. ttie-under 
of Utah 
hereby 
of an ong 
Witnej 
day of 
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TabB 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (2008) 
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of Committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of com-
mitting a robbery1 if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (2008) 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dan-
gerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
